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The paper studies agents’ investment decisions between general and speci…c in-
vestments under di¤erent ownership structures in a thin, decentralized market where
each agent’s decision a¤ects the decisions and welfare of other (otherwise unrelated)
agents mainly through indirect market linkages. The paper demonstrates that “excess
competition among investors,” in every equilibrium, will lead to e¢cient investments,
regardless of asset ownership. In the absence of such excess competition, in every
equilibrium, ine¢cient investments will result, unless some special ownership arrange-
ment is made. The problem in which the choice variable is investment level, instead
of investment type, is also studied.
11. Introduction
In this paper, we study agents’ investment decisions under di¤erent ownership struc-
tures in a thin, decentralized market where each agent’s decision a¤ects the decisions
and welfare of other (otherwise unrelated) agents mainly through indirect market link-
ages. Since the seminal papers by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore
(1990), several papers have been written to examine the costs and bene…ts of inte-
gration in the same incomplete contracting, or property rights approach,1 but under
various, di¤erent assumptions.2 Most of these analyses, including Grossman and Hart
and Hart and Moore, con…ne themselves to the study of the incentive issues among
agents within a …rm or within a bilateral relationship, while taking the outside mar-
ket as given. The present paper is an attempt to expand the domain of study to an
explicitly endogenized market environment.
The following example is illustrative of the problem which the present paper plans
to study. An economy consists of a number of bookkeepers and clients. A bookkeeper
is supposed to make human capital investment in order to assist a client. She can
choose either a general investment, which enables her to help any client, or a speci…c
investment, which while yielding a greater surplus enables her to help some pre-
identi…ed client only. In order to make an investment, each bookkeeper needs to
have access to a computer. In order to use a bookkeeper, each client needs to have
1For a nontechnical introduction of the approach, see Hart (1995).
2See, e.g., Chiu (1998), Dasgupta and Tao (1999), de Meza and Lockwood (1998a,b), and Rajan
and Zingales (1998).
1access to both a computer and a printer. We are interested in three types of simple
ownership structures: (1) the bookkeeper owns both a computer and a printer and
hires the “client” to manage the operations once the human capital investment is
made; (2) the bookkeeper owns a computer and the client a printer; and (3) the
client owns both a computer and a printer and hires the bookkeeper to work for him.
Suppose agents are organized in these three types of ownership structures. We want
to know: what investment decisions will bookkeepers of di¤erent ownership structures
make? More abstractly, the paper looks at a two stage game in which sellers make
investment decisions in the …rst stage, and bargain with buyers in the second stage.
As in the example, what a seller needs to choose is the investment type, rather than
the investment level, which is commonly studied in the literature. To help make a
contrast, we also provide analysis on the case where the choice is the investment level.
There are two reasons why we think the proposed problem is interesting. First,
choice of investment type, which is relatively neglected in the property rights litera-
ture, is a frequent decision which …rms need to make. It turns out that the roles of
competition and asset ownership in a¤ecting investment decisions are quite di¤erent
between problems with choice of investment types and those with investment levels.
The second point is related to the so called adverse e¤ect of ownership—that owning
more assets reduces the owner’s investment incentives. It has been pointed out that
availability of alternative buyers may motivate a seller to make general investments
(see, e.g., Tirole 1999, and Segal and Whinston 1998). This observation, however, is
incomplete in the sense that the seller may also face competition from other counter-
part sellers, or the alternative buyers have other alternatives as well. Hence to study
2an agent’s investment decision, we need to embed this problem in a larger one where
agents interact through the market.
In the literature, the adverse e¤ect of ownership has been the focus of study
in Chiu (1998), de Meza and Lockwood (1998a), and Rajan and Zingales (1998),
among others.3 Chiu and de Meza and Lockwood argue for the possibility that
assigning more assets to an agent may lead to a lower investment by that agent when
strategic bargaining honoring the “outside option principle” is used. In addition to
strategic bargaining, Rajan and Zingales provide two other instances—namely that
choice variable is investment type, and that investment reduces the investor’s outside
value—in which they maintain the e¤ect will take place. All these analyses, however,
focus on the relationship within a …rm, and do not consider the interplay between
market competition and investment.
The main results of the paper are as follows. First, when there are more sellers
than buyers, in every equilibrium all investing sellers will make e¢cient, speci…c in-
vestments, regardless of asset ownership; when there are fewer sellers than buyers, in
every equilibrium both employer-sellers and independent sellers will make ine¢cient,
general investments, while employee-sellers will make e¢cient, speci…c investments.
Second, ownership may a¤ect the probability of trade, in addition to the investment
choice. When there are more sellers than buyers, there will be multiple equilibria in
the investment game. Sellers who own both assets will trade with certainty in every
equilibrium, and sellers with one or no asset may not have a trade in some equilib-
3It has been touched on earlier by Holmstrom and Tirole (1991) and Tirole. Maskin and Tirole
(1999) also argues for the optimality of non-simple asset ownership.
3rium.4 Third, the role of competition and ownership in the extension of the model
where the choice is investment level is quite di¤erent. There exists an equilibrium
with the following properties. When the investment is speci…c enough (outside option
does not increase rapidly enough, or even decreases with the investment level), both
ownership and competition play no role in a¤ecting investment choices. When the
investment is relatively more general, employer-sellers will make a higher level and
more e¢cient investment than independent and employee-sellers do in the presence
of excess competition among buyers, and make the same investment as those other
sellers do in the absence of excess competition among buyers.
The …rst result, while demonstrating the harmful e¤ect of ownership, highlights
the role of excess competition among investors in enhancing e¢ciency.5 Note that our
results are invariant in all equilibria; while the features we identify can conceivably be
exhibited as an equilibrium outcome, it is not obvious that they are in fact invariant
properties of all equilibria. An implication of the role of excess competition identi…ed
above is that when the asset is not transferable, easier entry to the sellers market may
be the only way to remedy otherwise possible ine¢ciency.
A comparison between the …rst and the third results shows that there is a sharp
4Bolton and Whinston (1993) consider the case of an upstream …rm (seller) and two downstream
…rms (buyers), where the buyers make investments. They exogenously specify a probability that the
seller will not be able to serve both buyers. Their paper does not deal with general versus speci…c
investment choices, and their results are, not surprisingly, very di¤erent from ours. However, their
paper is one of the earliest we know of to pose the issue of investment and ownership in a market
context.
5This can be understood through the following “stylized” fact which we think common in US
graduate schools. When there are a large number of available supervisors to choose from, a grad-
uate student is better o¤ by investing more in general knowledge without hurrying in sticking to a
particular teacher. When there is a limited number of available supervisors, he or she is better o¤
by earlier engagement with a particular teacher and hence earlier investment that is speci…c to that
teacher.
4distinction between the incentives associated with investment type and with invest-
ment level. Our result that adverse e¤ect of ownership does not exist even if an
increase in investment can lead to a decrease in outside option contrasts with that of
Rajan and Zingales. The contribution here is not to point out the general possibility
of the adverse e¤ect of ownership but to clarify the conditions for such an e¤ect to
take place. Since the apparent possibility of contradictory results is sometimes viewed
as one di¢culty of the property rights approach (see Holmstrom 1999), we think such
clari…cation is needed.
As far as we know, the only paper that studies investment decisions in a market
context in the property rights literature is the paper by de Meza and Lockwood
(1998b). The paper, however, di¤ers signi…cantly from ours. Among other di¤erences,
it adopts a search approach, which makes each agent in the model atomistic and
nonpivotal, and a repeated production framework, which di¤ers from most papers in
the literature, including ours, where a single period problem is studied.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 presents our bargaining solution as well as justi…cations. Section 4 studies the
investment choice given the bargaining solution introduced in Section 3. Section 5
provides two extensions, one involving choices of investment levels, and the other
involving choices of investment types. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
2. Model
There are two given sets of agents, whom we call sellers and buyers, respectively.
Denote the set of each as S and B, respectively. There are two kinds of assets, as
5and ab: There are equal numbers of as assets and sellers, and equal numbers of ab
assets and buyers. The assets are important because each seller needs to have access
to a piece of as in order to make and transfer any investment, and each buyer needs
to have access to a piece of ab in order to make use of the investment made by and
received from any seller.
We are interested in a market consisting of three types of …rms. A type 1 …rm
is an integrated …rm in which a seller owns a pair of as and ab; and hires a buyer
without any asset to manage her ab; the set of these sellers and buyers is denoted by
S1 and B1, respectively. A type 2 …rm is an independent seller or buyer who owns
one piece of as or ab; respectively; the set of these sellers and buyers is denoted by S2
and B2, respectively. A type 3 …rm is an integrated …rm in which a buyer owns a pair
of as and ab; and hires a seller without any asset to manage his as; the set of these
sellers and buyers is denoted by S3 and B3, respectively. Clearly, S = S1 [ S2 [ S3;
B = B1 [ B2 [ B3;Si \ Sj = Á; for i 6= j and Bi \ Bj = Á for i 6= j: Denoting jAj
as the cardinality of set A; we have jS1j = jB1j;jS3j = jB3j; jSj = jS1j+ jS2j + jS3j;
and jBj = jB1j + jB2j + jB3j:
Given the market structure, we consider a two stage game in which sellers each
make investments simultaneously in stage 1, and bargain and trade with buyers in
stage 2. Each seller can make either a general investment or a speci…c investment. A
general investment yields a valuation of m > 0 to one who purchases it. A speci…c
investment yields a valuation of M > m > M=2 to the buyer for whom the investment
is speci…cally made, and yields a zero valuation otherwise. To make an investment, a
seller incurs the same cost c > 0, regardless of the seller’s identity and the investment
6type. To be economically interesting, we assume that M=2 ¡ c > m=2 ¡ c > 0:
Clearly, a speci…c investment is more e¢cient than a general investment, as long as
it does not lead to duplication. We also assume that each seller’s investment can
be used by at most one buyer, that investments are non-resalable, and that each
buyer will need only one investment. We assume also that the terms of trade are
determined by ex post bargaining, which will be explained in detail in the next section.
To be consistent with the property rights literature, we adopt the assumption that
investments, exchange, and bargaining are voluntary and hence integration per se
does not change the available investment types and parties with whom the bargaining
is conducted. All of the above, including the investment decisions once made and the
bargaining solution, are commonly known.
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we …rst introduce more notation for stage 2 bargaining and then
describe the bargaining solution to be used. Consider a partition of Si;i = 1;2;3:
Let Si
1 µ Si be the set of sellers with a general investment; Si
2 µ Si the set of sellers
in Si with a speci…c investment for a buyer in Bl;l ¸ i such that no other seller in
Sr;r · l has the same investment (i.e., nonduplicate speci…c investment);6 Si
3 µ Si
the set of sellers with a speci…c investment for some buyer in Bl;l ¸ i such that there
is some other seller in Sr;r · l who also has the same investment (i.e., duplicate
6Hereafter, we will simply refer a seller’s investment in such a scenario as a nonduplicate speci…c
investment.
7speci…c investment);7 Si
4 µ Si the set of sellers in Si with a speci…c investment which
is not speci…c to anybody in Bl;l ¸ i; and Si
5 µ Si the set of sellers in Si with
no investments at all. Similarly, consider a partition of Bi;i = 1;2;3: Let Bi
1 µ
Bi be the set of buyers for whom no sellers in Sr;r · i have speci…c investments;
Bi
2 µ Bi the set of buyers for whom there is only one seller in Sr;r · i that has a
speci…c investment, and Bi
3 µ Bi the set of buyers for whom there are more than
one seller in [r·iSr that have speci…c investments.8 Clearly,
P5
j=1 jSi
jj = jSij and
P3
j=1 jBi









De…ning ¢i ´ jSi
1j ¡ jBi
1j as the excess supply of general investments from Si to
Bi,i = 1;2;3; we can de…ne
E1 ´ ¢1 + minf0;¢2 + minf0;¢3gg; (3.2)
E2 ´ maxf0;¢1g + ¢2 + minf0;¢3g; (3.3)
and E3 ´ maxf0;maxf0;¢1g + ¢2g + ¢3 (3.4)
as the excess supply of general investments (from S1 [ S2 [ S3) to buyers in Bi;i =
7Hereafter, we will simply refer a seller’s investment in such a scenario as a duplicate speci…c
investment.
8Since members in Si
4 and Si
5 do not play any role in the bargaining process, we will simply ignore
them in the later-on analysis, nor will we explicitly specify their payo¤s in the description of the
bargaining solution.
81;2;3; respectively. Let us consider one of them, say E1, a bit more. Since buyers in
B1
1 do not own any as and ab, they can obtain general investments only by purchasing
from sellers who have both as and ab, i.e., sellers in S1
1, and not from anybody else.
Hence even if ¢2 ¸ 0 and ¢3 ¸ 0; the excess supply of general investment to B1 is
simply jS1
1j¡jB1
1j; i.e., ¢1: However, buyers in B2
1 and B3
1 may also need to buy from
S1
1 in the cases that ¢2 < 0 or ¢3 < 0: Hence taking this possibility into account, the
excess supply of general investments to buyers in B1 is further reduced, as described





3 be the equilibrium price in trade obtained by sellers in Si
1 (gen-
eral investments); Si
2 (nonduplicate speci…c investments); and Si
3 (duplicate speci…c
investments); respectively. Explicitly, we assume an equal treatment principle that
sellers who made similar investment decisions receive the same payo¤. Throughout
the paper, we will make use of a bargaining solution with the following properties:
1. Matching between sellers and buyers is e¢cient, i.e., matching is such that social
welfare is maximized, and
2. The equilibrium trading prices pi
j are as described in Table 1.
9A little thought shows that ¢1 must be nonpositive. Hence the …rst term in the right hand side
of (3.3)—maxf0;¢1g—is zero and can be omitted from the expression. But we choose to retain the





> 0 0 M ¡ m 0
= 0 m=2 M=2 0
< 0 m M=2 0
Table 1.




Consider the payo¤ from making a general investment. When there is zero excess
supply of general investments to buyers in Bi (Ei = 0), the ex post surplus of a
general investment m is equally split between its seller and buyer, i.e., a result of Nash-
Rubinstein bargaining outcome prevails.10 When there is excess demand (Ei < 0)
or excess supply (Ei > 0), the price is driven up to clear the market (at a price of
m), or down to clear the market (at a price of 0), resulting in a gain of m or 0 to
the seller, respectively. This illustrates a feature of the auction-Walrasian outcome.
Note that making a general investment is not necessarily more secure than a speci…c
investment, even though there may be a sizeable number of alternative buyers for
general investments in the market.
Consider next the payo¤ from making a speci…c investment. It is clear that the
payo¤ depends very much on whether or not the speci…c investment is duplicated.
In case of duplication, competition among sellers with the same speci…c investment
10See Nash (1950) and Rubinstein (1982) for the Nash bargaining solution and Rubinstein alter-
nating bargaining game, respectively.
10leads to a zero price; the buyer extracts all of the surplus created by the speci…c
investment. This again illustrates the auction-Walrasian outcome. When the speci…c
investment is distinct, the price depends very much on whether or not the outside
option is binding. The outside option that buyers in Bi
2;i = 1;2;3 can take is a
general investment. When there is excess supply of general investment (i.e., Ei > 0),
a general investment is sold at a price of 0, resulting in a bene…t of m to a buyer.
Therefore a buyer in Bi
2;i = 1;2;3; can secure a payo¤ of maxfm;M=2g, resulting
in the nonduplicate speci…c investment’s price equaling minfM ¡ m;M=2g: By our
earlier assumption that m > M=2, this price becomes M¡m: When there is no excess
supply (i.e., Ei · 0), purchasing a general investment (at a price of m=2 or m) will
bring in a bene…t of at most m=2. Therefore, a buyer in Bi
2 will consider this outside
option unattractive, and the distinct investment’s price is M=2;i = 1;2;3. This is a
generalization of the outside option principle in 2 person noncooperative bargaining.11
3.2. Justi…cation of the Bargaining Solution
Our bargaining solution is an equilibrium in the following generalized alternating bar-
gaining game a la Rubinstein (1982). The post-investment bargaining stage consists
possibly of an in…nite number of substages t = 1;2;3;:::: In odd substages, each seller
makes public o¤ers on how much she is willing to accept to sell her investment. It is
assumed that each o¤er is publicly announced, and available to any responder at the
same, nonpreferential price. Each buyer publicly announces whether and from whom
11See Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) and Sutton (1986) for the outside option principle,
and Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1989) for experimental support of the principle.
11he is willing to accept an o¤er; each buyer can accept at most one o¤er. If an o¤er is
accepted by one responder, then the proposer and the responder trade accordingly. If
it is accepted by more than one responder, then among the acceptors one is randomly
chosen with equal probability for the trading. Players who have traded will disappear
from the game, the remaining players will proceed to the next substage to repeat the
preceding substage with the roles of proposers and responders being switched. The
process goes on until all opportunities of potentially bene…cial trade are exhausted.
Agents have the same common discount factor ± < 1 across substages: The structure
and payo¤ of the game are commonly known.
The proof that this game gives our bargaining solution as one limiting equilibrium
outcome as ± approaches unity is fairly tedious. A sketch is relegated to the Appendix.
Two remarks on the assumptions of the bargaining game are in order. First, we
assume that each o¤er is publicly announced and available to any responder at the
same, nonpreferential price. This restriction is made to simplify the exposition, and
there is no particular reason why o¤ers cannot have other properties. In fact, one can
show that the equilibrium outcome that we are interested in survives the relaxation
that o¤ers are allowed to be also private. Since we do not claim uniqueness of the
equilibrium outcome here, we do not see any serious problem with this assumption.
Second, given the structure of the bargaining game, collusion among sellers or among
buyers is explicitly ruled out in the model. When collusion among sellers or among
buyers is allowed (e.g., the Shapley value is used), the long side’s agents’ payo¤s from
general investment may not drop to zero.
This latter consideration does not, however, have as much force as it …rst appears
12to have. The reason is that such a collusion is not immune to deviation. To see this,
consider a simple economy in which all …rms are independent, there are more sellers
than buyers, and all sellers make general investment. Since the quantity supplied of
general investment is greater than the quantity demanded, our bargaining solution
predicts that all general investments that are sold will be sold at a zero price. Suppose
this is not the case, and some seller s0 sells her general investment at a positive price
p > 0: All other agents then receive a total payo¤ of at most nm ¡ p < nm: But by
colluding to form a subcoalition, these other agents jointly obtain nm. Hence there
must exist some new allocation that makes each of them better o¤. In other words,
collusion among agents on the long side will be broken by other coalitions. More
important, any allocation that is in the core must have the property that players on
the long side receive a zero payo¤.12 The following Lemma is easy to show (all proofs
of lemmas and propositions are relegated to the Appendix).
Lemma 3.1. 1. The allocation resulting from our bargaining solution is in the
core.
2. If an allocation is in the core, then it must prescribe that:
(a) e¢cient matching, i.e., matching is such that social welfare is maximized.
(b) for Ei > 0;pi
1 = 0;i = 1;2;3:
(c) for Ei < 0;pi
1 = m;i = 1;2;3:
(d) pi
3 = 0;i = 1;2;3:
12In other words, the allocation given by the Shapley value, which is used by Hart and Moore and
Rajan and Zingales, is not in the core, despite the core’s existence. See Shapley (1955), Gul (1989,
1999), and Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) for the foundations of the Shapley value.
13(e) pi
1 = 0 ) pi
2 · M ¡ m:
Note that two other conditions are required to exactly tie down our bargaining
solution; namely (1) the equal split of the surplus when the outside option is nonbind-
ing, and (2) the payo¤ a player receives from a bilateral relationship simply matches
his/her outside option if the outside option is binding. Since these two features of our
bargaining solution are less controversial and since it is reasonable to require that the
bargaining solution be in the core, our bargaining solution appears a reasonable one.
4. Investment Decisions
In this Section, we study the investment game using the bargaining solution previously
stipulated. It turns out that the result will depend critically on whether there are
more sellers than buyers.
4.1. Excess Competition among Sellers (jSj ¸ jBj)
We …rst study the case in which jSj ¸ jBj: The following result is easy to obtain
(proof omitted).
Proposition 4.1. Suppose jSj ¸ jBj. The following is an equilibrium outcome:
1. All employer-sellers (sellers in S1) make investments speci…c to their respective
employee-buyers.
2. jB2j independent sellers (sellers in S2) make investments speci…c to a di¤erent
independent buyer.
143. All employee-sellers (sellers in S3) make investments speci…c to their respective
employer-buyers.
4. Every speci…c investment is traded at a price of M=2, i.e., the ex post gain from
trade is equally split between a seller and a buyer.
That the above is an equilibrium outcome is easy to understand. Consider an
employer-seller in S1. Given the investment choices of all other sellers as prescribed by
Proposition 3.1, by making a speci…c investment, the seller basically faces a bilateral
monopoly with her employee-buyer. This leads to an equal split of ex post surplus M.
By making general investment, she still faces a bilateral monopoly with her employee-
buyer, and hence gets only m=2 from bargaining. It is true that her general investment
is available to all other buyers. But this apparent availability of more buyers does not
enhance her bargaining power. The essence is that each other buyer has a speci…c
investment available for him, and that the speci…c investment yields a greater bene…t
to that buyer than a general investment does. As a result, the general investment
that this employer-seller has is unattractive to other buyers, and hence making such
an investment is not a wise decision. By a similar argument, the speci…c investment
prescriptions for S2 and S3 are also optimal.
Note that some independent sellers do not make any investment, given that all
sellers in S1 and S3 and jB2j independent sellers in S2 have speci…c investments.
Let us consider the optimal strategy of one of these noninvesting sellers (the seller
must be in S2). Suppose all other sellers follow the prescription above. By making
a general investment, she has a group of potential buyers (all buyers in B2 and B3).
15The di¢culty is that all of these buyers already have a speci…c investment available
in the market. The e¤ect of the availability of the general investment is simply to
reduce the equilibrium price of these speci…c investments from M=2 to M ¡m; while
the general investment will never be purchased. On the other hand, if the seller makes
a speci…c investment for some buyer in B2 and B3 (any buyer in B1 will not be able
to purchase from sellers in S2), then the investment becomes duplicated and will not
be sold at any positive price. Hence no investment is indeed optimal for the seller.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose jSj ¸ jBj: Every equilibrium outcome of the investment
game has the following properties:
1. Only jBj distinct speci…c investments are made; no general investments are
made.
2. For every buyer, an investment speci…c for him will be produced.
3. Employer-sellers (sellers in S1) each will make a speci…c investment.
4. The speci…c investments that employer-sellers (employee-sellers) made are for
employee-buyers (employer-buyers).
5. The speci…c investments that independent sellers (sellers in S2) made are for
independent buyers (buyers in B2) and possibly for employer-buyers (buyers in
B3), but not for employee-buyers (buyers in B1).
The most important result in the proposition is that in all equilibria of the game,
general investment will never be chosen. The basic insight for this is as follows.
Remember that when Ei < 0, a general investment is more pro…table relative to a
16speci…c investment for a seller in Si : Take S1 as an example. If some employer-sellers
in S1 make a speci…c investment for buyers in B2 [ B3; then de…nitely ¢1 < 0 and
E1 < 0: In this case, whoever in S1 makes a general investment will get a payo¤ of
m > M=2. However, this higher pro…t is not feasible because each aforementioned
seller who made a speci…c investment for B2 [ B3 will have a bene…cial unilateral
deviation from a speci…c investment to a general investment so as to make a surplus
of m > M=2. What this means is that rationality rules out the possibility of sellers in
S1 making speci…c investments for buyers in B2[B3: Hence ¢1 = 0 and E1 = 0; and
the general investments by any seller in S1 becomes unpro…table. A similar argument
shows that in turn members in S2 and S3 will never make general investments.
The proposition also points out two kinds of indeterminacy in the game. First, the
person for whom a seller’s speci…c investment is made may vary from one equilibrium
to another. For instance, in one equilibrium each employer-seller in S1 makes a spe-
ci…c investment for her subordinate-buyer, while another equilibrium di¤ers from the
former in that each seller in S1 makes a speci…c investment for some buyer in B1 who
is not her subordinate. So long as these speci…c investments are not duplicates, these
two equilibria yield the same payo¤s to all investing parties. Hence this indeterminacy
is inconsequential.
The second type of indeterminacy is somewhat di¤erent. It is possible as an equi-
librium outcome that an employee-seller (a seller in S3) does not make any investment,
foreseeing that a speci…c investment for her employee-buyer will be made by some in-
dependent seller (seller in S2). The maximum number of such noninvesting sellers in
S3 is minfjS3j;jS2j ¡ jB2jg: Taking into account Proposition 3.1 in which some S2
17do not have an investment, we know that the fates of sellers in S2 and S3 are not as
promising as those in S1: The ownership of both assets ensures a seller with certainty
of successful trade, as evidently sellers in S1 all will have trades in all equilibria, but a
seller in S2 or S3 may not have a trade in some equilibrium. In other words, when all
equilibria are likely ex ante, absence of ownership cripples the seller with fewer assets
and a smaller probability of having trade. In the literature, the absence of ownership
is usually thought to lead to ine¢ciency in investment. The idea that it is conducive
to a lower probability of trade is new, as far as we know.13
4.2. Excess Competition among Buyers (jSj < jBj)
In this subsection, we study the opposite case where jSj < jBj. In contrast to the
previous case, ownership matters but in a way di¤erent from Hart and Moore’s general
insight.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose jSj < jBj: Every equilibrium of the game has the follow-
ing properties:
1. Employer-sellers (sellers in S1) will each make a general investment.
2. Independent sellers (sellers in S2) will each make a general investment.
3. Employee-sellers (sellers in S3) will each make an investment distinctly speci…c
to some employer-buyer in B3:
13Note that while a lower probability of trade is an issue to the agent, it is never an issue to society
at large, as far as social welfare is concerned.
18It is easy to see that the above description constitutes an equilibrium. Consider
the actions of sellers in S1 and S2: When every other member in S1 [ S2 makes a
general investment, a member in S1 [ S2 can extract a payo¤ of m by making a
general investment. The point is that the number of general investments available for
all buyers in B1 and B2 is jS1j+jS2j only. But jB1j+jB2j > jS1j+jS2j: This excess
demand drives the equilibrium price up to m. The excess demand by B1 and B2 is
the crucial reason that both S1 and S2 making general investment can constitute an
equilibrium here, but cannot in Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 for jBj · jSj: The general
lesson found in Hart and Moore that asset ownership enhances the asset owner’s
incentive to make more appropriate investments does not hold in this context.
The above points out that the driving force of the ine¢ciency is that sellers take
advantage of the excess competition on the part of buyers. In order to restore e¢-
ciency, sellers should refrain from taking advantage of the excess buyer competition.
This is precisely why sellers in S3 all make e¢cient, speci…c investments. In our
model, employer-sellers are free to bargain and trade with other buyers. In this sense,
they receive no more restrictions than under the no-integration case. The di¤erence,
however, is that e¤ectively the excessively competing buyers disappear from the mar-
ket. Note that sellers in type 3 (integrated) …rms now do not possess any asset. In
order to have a successful match, they have to look for buyers who have both kinds
of assets. That is, they can only bargain and trade with buyers in B3, while B1 and
B2 are no longer feasible for these sellers. Now the number of potential buyers for
these sellers no longer exceeds the sellers in number. The excess competition among
players is therefore eliminated.
19Two remarks are in order here. First, we implicitly assumed that the investment
the seller makes is human capital, which is inalienable from the seller. If the invest-
ment is physical, then it is even more clearly that type 3 …rms are preferable because
each seller now cannot use her physical capital, which is a property of the type 3
…rm, for any use outside the …rm without her boss’s approval. The second point is
that alleviating the ine¢ciency problem through ownership arrangements may not
be feasible. When the assets as that sellers need to have access to are inalienable
(for instance, as may be human capital, or a nontransferable license), a change in
the ownership of as is simply impossible. Recall that ine¢cient decisions are made
because there is too little competition among sellers. Thus, one way to correct the
incentive is to allow easy entry to the seller market. By allowing enough sellers in
the market, sellers would switch from making general investments to making speci…c
investments.
5. Extensions
In this section, we want to brie‡y look at two variants of the model in order to help
sharpen our understanding. The …rst variant is one in which a seller is still productive
even if she does not have any investment. The second variant is one in which each
seller chooses the investment level, rather than the investment type.
5.1. Noninvesting Sellers yet Productive
Let the surplus created by a noninvesting seller and any buyer be the same and equal
to k: The economically interesting case is where k < m¡c < M ¡c: Then it is natural
20to assume that the surplus jointly created by a buyer and a seller with a speci…c—but
not speci…c to that buyer—investment is also k: Using this new set of parameters,
we can compute a new bargaining solution that respects the three principles outlined
before. It can be shown that when k is small enough (k=2 < M=2 ¡ c), the results
we obtained in the last section regarding optimal asset ownership and the role of
competition will not be altered at all. However, when k=2 > M=2 ¡ c, the story will
be quite di¤erent. What this condition means is that no investment is more attractive
than speci…c investment as long as the surplus is split equally. It can be shown that,
in the case of jSj > jBj; in every equilibrium (1) employer-sellers will simply make
no investments, while (2) a total number of jB2j + jB3j sellers of other types will
make speci…c investments as the last section predicted. In other words, the employer-
sellers no longer plan to make speci…c investment as the last section predicted. This
diversion of incentives does not occur for independent sellers and employee-sellers,
however. The reason is that they are not shielded from excess competition among
sellers as employer-sellers are. Because jS2j+jS3j > jB2j+jB3j, some sellers from S2
and S3 are bound to have no buyers. Hence any noninvesting seller in S2 and S3 will
receive a zero payo¤ from trading with a buyer. But by making a speci…c investment
(provided that no other seller makes the same investment), the seller can secure a
positive (net of cost) payo¤ of M=2 ¡ c, which is clearly more preferable. Hence in
this case of high value of no investment, competition among the sellers may not be
strong enough to induce employer-sellers to make speci…c investments. The correct
incentive is provided only by reducing the assets owned by the sellers. This insight
is consistent with the last section in that for the case of jSj < jBj; depletion of asset
21ownership will enhance sellers’ incentives to make speci…c investments.
5.2. Sellers Choosing Investment Levels
The second variant di¤ers from our main model in the following way. Each seller’s
decisions are the level of a speci…c investment, and to whom the investment is speci…c.
This model is more in line with the modeling practise in the property rights theory
literature. Denote the investment level as e, and the corresponding cost as c(e); which
is increasing, strictly convex, twice di¤erentiable, and with c(0) = 0 and c0(0) = 0:
The surplus the seller creates together with a buyer (along with a pair of as and ab) is
f(e) if the buyer is the one whom the investment is speci…c for, and is g(e) otherwise.
The two functions f(e) and g(e) have the following properties: f(0) = g(0) = k ¸ 0;
f(e) = k + e; g(e) = k + ®e; where ¡1 < ® < 1 (hence f(e) ¸ g(e); for all e): The
assumption of linearity of the payo¤ function in the investment is quite standard,
and is without loss of generality; see, for example, Tirole, and Aghion and Tirole
(1997) for similar formulations. The interpretation of ® is in order. For 0 < ® < 1;
investment increases both the surplus from the prospective relationship with the buyer
the investment is targeted for, as well as the surplus from alternative relationships.
For ® < 0; investment is so speci…c that its increase will in fact reduce its value of
use in any alternative relationship. This speci…cation is less frequently used in the
literature, and is one of the formulations that Rajan and Zingales used in arguing
that assigning asset ownership to an investor will reduce his investment incentive.
In order to accommodate the speci…cation that at the same time g0(e) < 0 and
g(e) > 0, the possibility that k > 0 is necessary. To prevent the reduced investment
22incentive studied in the previous subsection due to the high payo¤ of no investment,
k is assumed to be small enough.
A complete analysis of this problem is very involved, mainly because in order to
solve the equilibrium of the game one needs to …rst specify the bargaining outcome for
every pro…le of sellers’ investment levels. Here we are content to examine a focal equi-
librium in which sellers of the same ownership each make the same level of investment
whenever investing. This focal equilibrium can be called semi-symmetric in the sense
that an asymmetry may occur such that some sellers of the same ownership may not
invest while others do. Consider the case of jSj ¸ jBj: In this equilibrium, all sellers
in S1and S3 make investments; only jB2j sellers in S2 make investments; and sellers’
investments are of the same level and are not duplicates.14 It is easy to see why this
can constitute an equilibrium. Given a pro…le of investments by others as prescribed
by this equilibrium, the last seller who is prescribed to invest will have no incentive
to deviate by making a duplicate investment. Furthermore, each investing seller must
choose a level of nonduplicate investment equal to e¤ ´ argmaxef1
2f(e) ¡ c(e)g.15
In other words, ownership does not play a role in enhancing e¢ciency; employer-
sellers, independent sellers, and employee-sellers make the same investment whenever
investing. The result is invariant for any value of ® where ¡1 < ® < 1:
The case of jSj < jBj is di¤erent. We consider three di¤erent speci…cations
here: (1) k = 0 and ® > 1=2; (2) k = 0 and 0 · ® · 1=2; and (3) k > 0
14In order for this to be an equilibrium outcome, we also require that members in Si make invest-
ments for Bi only, i = 1;2;3:
15Any alternative relationship only will a value of g(e¤) < f(e¤) to the seller and buyer. This
renders this outside option unattractive to both the seller and the buyer. Hence, the choice of e¤ on
the part of each investming seller becomes self ful…lling.
23and ® < 0: For speci…cation (1), the focal equilibrium has the following features.






= argmaxefg(e)¡c(e)g:16 Employee-sellers, how-
ever, will only make a speci…c investment e¤ ´ argmaxef1
2f(e) ¡ c(e)g < e e as excess
outside opportunities are unavailable. Note that e e is closer to the socially optimal
investment than e¤: In this case, in the presence of excess competition on the part of
buyers, ownership (of at least one asset) by sellers leads to a more e¢cient outcome
than no ownership at all. For both speci…cations (2) and (3), the excess opportunities
available for employer-sellers and independent sellers are no longer attractive. Hence
the focal equilibrium is such that they will make an investment of e¤; as employee-
sellers will do. Here ownership does not play any role in enhancing e¢ciency; all sellers
will choose the same investment level. Summing up the results for speci…cations (1)
to (3), we can conclude that, to enhance e¢ciency, the investor owning more assets is
(at least weakly) more preferable. This is in line with Hart and Moore: more assets
lead to a greater outside option, hence leading to a greater investment.
A remark contrasting our result and that of Rajan and Zingales is in order. Under
our speci…cation (3), i.e., when each seller’s value of use in an outside relationship goes
down with her investment, we found that assigning ownership of as or both as and ab
to the seller does not reduce her investment incentive (for both cases of jSj ¸ jBj and
jBj < jSj). This is in contrast with Rajan and Zingales’s prediction of an adverse e¤ect
of ownership. The di¤erence is due to the fact that di¤erent bargaining solutions are
used in the analysis. In our bargaining solution with the outside option principle, an
16It is because jS1j + jS2j < jB1j + jB2j:
24agent’s outside option in general does not enhance one’s payo¤ from bargaining unless
it reaches a critical level. In the Shapley value, an agent’s outside option a¤ects one’s
bargaining payo¤ in a positive way. Hence with standard assumptions in Hart and
Moore, where outside option increases with investment, Shapley value gives a more
positive role of asset ownership in enhancing investment e¢ciency than the outside
option principle does. In Rajan and Zingales, where the outside option decreases
with investment, Shapley value gives a more negative role of asset ownership than the
outside option principle does.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the optimal asset ownership in a particular setting. While in line
with the incomplete contracting approach, the problem discussed is new in that the
choice variable is investment type and an explicit market consisting of multiple sellers
and buyers is studied. In the section of extensions, we also studied variants of the
main model that allow for, respectively, noninvesting sellers to generate a positive
surplus and the choice variable to be investment level rather than solely investment
type.
One general insight obtained is about the role competition plays in a¤ecting in-
vestment incentives. A seller can improve her payo¤ by two means: (1) to make herself
the monopolist of the product wanted by her designated buyer; and (2) to generate
competition among the designated buyer and alternative buyers for the product which
the seller plans to sell. When the choice variable is investment type, (1) is achieved
by choosing speci…c investment and (2) by choosing general investment. So there is
25a trade-o¤ between these two methods of increasing payo¤. In the presence of excess
competition among sellers, the second option is so unfavorable that the …rst option is
chosen by every investing seller. In the presence of excess competition among buyers,
the second option dominates the …rst option except for the sellers who do not own any
assets. Hence, the trade-o¤ between the two payo¤ maximizing motives (or between
the two investment types) is resolved as a function of the market structure, charac-
terized by the numbers of sellers and buyers as well as the ownership structures.17
When the choice variable is investment level, however, the trade-o¤ between the
two motives no longer exists. Both motives are ful…lled by the choice of the same
speci…c investment. Whereas the bene…t from the …rst motive (to become a monop-
olist) is constrained by the necessity of the designated partner, a seller however may
enhance her payo¤ if she can make use of the second motive, which enhances the
seller’s outside option. Hence, when there are more sellers than buyers, the second
motive will lead employer-sellers and independent sellers to choose a greater, more
appropriate investment level than employee-sellers will choose.
Two …nal remarks are in order here. First, the analysis is economized by the
use of a bargaining solution, which has the properties (under di¤erent competitive
scenarios) of: (1) e¢ciency, (2) Nash bargaining solution, (3) outside option principle,
and (4) auction-Walrasian outcome. While we maintain that our bargaining solution
is justi…able, we also recognize that di¤erent views, especially in which the payo¤ to
the long side’s agents is not driven down to zero, are possible. However, the general
17The above two motives are independently pointed out in a paper by Nicita (1999), which also
coins the scenario in which sellers face multiple buyers and have mutiple investment choices as “cross
competition.”
26insight that, when decision variable is investment type, an increase in competition
among sellers will make sellers more likely to make speci…c investment is still valid
even if a further relaxation of assumptions is made. The premise of this insight is
that, other things being equal, increasing competition among sellers reduces payo¤
from general investment. Thus so long as a bargaining solution respects this, there
must exist a critical number such that regardless of ownership structure sellers will
make speci…c investment when they exceed that number.
Second, our result of the harmful e¤ect of ownership di¤ers from related results in
Chiu, de Meza and Lockwood, and Rajan and Zingales in an important dimension.
In those papers, the outside market was assumed …xed, independent of the conceived
parties. The emphasis was usually on the investment incentives of both parties in
a bilateral relationship. That is, the strategic relationship was among parties who
would trade/cooperate ex post. Rajan and Zingales, while allowing for a multilateral
relationship in which several agents work in a single …rm, still retain the feature that
these agents know ex ante that they will cooperate ex post. This is not the case here.
Here all investors will never bene…t from working together as a …rm, as in all the
other papers cited. Therefore, the strategic interactions occur indirectly through the
market.
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30Appendix A. A sketch of proof of the bargaining solution as a Subgame
Perfect Equilibrium Outcome of an Alternating O¤er Game.
Proposition A.1. There exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, which is reached
immediately without delay and which approaches our bargaining solution as ±
approaches unity.
Before we describe the equilibrium strategy, some notation is in order. Let Eit
be the excess supply of general investment to Bit at substage t; and Sit
j (Bit
j ) be the
corresponding Si
j (Bi
j) still in the market at the beginning of substage t;i = 1;2;3;j =
1;2;3: Let sit
jk (bit
jk) be the kth seller in Sit
j (kth buyer in Bit
j ), i = 1;2;3;j = 1;2;3:
We name each player as follows as the game evolves from time t to time t+1: Let





1 j who is still in the market at stage t + 1
be denoted by s
i;t+1











who is still in the market at stage t + 1; has a nonduplicate speci…c investment, and
has a buyer of the speci…c investment still around at stage t+1 be denoted by s
i;t+1
2k :





3 j who is still in the market at stage t+1
but with a duplicate speci…c investment be denoted by s
i;t+1
3k : Likewise, we can name
each buyer as the game evolves. In this order-preserving manner, we can identify each
player unambiguously in each stage given any history.
We …rst de…ne two sets of prices e pi
j and pi
j as follows:









0 minfM ¡ m;M=(1 + ±)g 0
m=(1 + ±) M=(1 + ±) 0
m M=(1 + ±) 0









0 minfM ¡ m;M=(1 + ±)g 0
±m=(1 + ±) ±M=(1 + ±) 0
m ±M=(1 + ±) 0
Table A1
The on-the-equilibrium-path strategy prescription is as follows. P1a (1 and 2)
describes what each player does when being a proposer, and P1b (3 to 10) describes
what each player does when being a responder and P1a has just been played.
1. When sellers propose, si
jk publicly proposes to sell his investment to anybody
at e pi
j, k = 1;2;::;jSi
jj; i = 1;2;3; j = 1;2;3:
2. When buyers propose, bi
jk proposes pi
j for any general investment (for j = 1) and
for the investment speci…c to himself (for j = 2;3), k = 1;2;::;jBi
jj; i = 1;2;3;
32j = 1;2;3:
3. bi
2k accepts to buy from the seller who has a speci…c investment for him where
k = 1;2;3;:::; and i = 1;2;3. Buyer bi
3k accept to buy with equal probability
from the sellers who have duplicate speci…c investments where k = 1;2;3;:::;
and i = 1;2;3.
4. b1
1k …rst accepts to buy from sellers in S1
1 in order (i.e., b1
1k buying from s1
1k in
S1
1; etc.), k = 1;2;:::. If jS1
1j < jB1
1j; excess buyers each (k = jS1
1j + 1;jS1
1j +
2;:::) accept to buy from sellers in S1
1 independently and randomly with equal
probability.
5. b2
1k …rst accepts to buy from sellers in S2
1 in order, k = 1;2;:::.. If jS2
1j < jB2
1j;
excess buyers each (k = jS2
1j+1;jS1
1j+2;:::) accept to buy in order from sellers
in S1
1 whose o¤ers are not accepted as prescribed by (4). The remaining excess
buyers accept to buy independently and randomly with equal probability from
all sellers whose o¤ers are supposed to be accepted as prescribed above by (5).
6. In the same manner as (4) and (5), b3
1k …rst accept to buy from sellers in S3
1
in order, k = 1;2;:::. The excess buyers accept to buy in order from sellers in
S2
1 whose o¤ers are not accepted as prescribed in (4) and (5). The remaining
buyers accept to buy in order from sellers in S1
1 whose o¤ers are not accepted
as prescribed by (4) and (5). The further remaining buyers accept to buy
independently and randomly with equal probability from sellers whose o¤ers
are supposed to be accepted as prescribed above by (6).
337. si
jk accepts to sell to the buyer for whom the seller has a speci…c investment
where k = 1;2;3;:::;j = 2;3; and i = 1;2;3.
8. s3
1k accepts to sell to buyers in B3
1 in order (i.e., s3
1k sells to b3
1k in B3
1; etc.),
k = 1;2;:::. If jS3
1j > jB3
1j; excess sellers (k = jB3
1j + 1;jB3
1j + 2;:::) accept to
sell to all buyers in B3
1 independently and randomly with equal probability.
9. s2
1k …rst accepts to sell to buyers in B2
1 in order, k = 1;2;:::.. If jS2
1j > jB2
1j;
excess sellers (k = jS2
1j + 1;jS2
1j + 2;:::) each accept to sell in order to buyers
in B1
1 whose o¤ers are not accepted as prescribed by (8). The remaining excess
sellers accept to sell independently and randomly with equal probability to all
buyers whose o¤ers are supposed to be accepted as prescribed above by (9).
10. In the same manner as (8) and (9), s1
1k …rst accepts to sell to buyers in B1
1
in order, k = 1;2;3;:::. The excess sellers accept to sell in order to B2
1 whose
o¤ers are not accepted as prescribed by (9). The remaining sellers accept to
sell in order to B3
1 whose o¤ers are not accepted as prescribed by (8) and (9).
The further remaining sellers then accept to sell randomly and independently
with equal probability to all buyers whose o¤ers are supposed to be accepted as
prescribed above by (10).
It is straightforward to verify the following two lemmas.
Lemma A.2. Given P1a and P1b are played in stage t, then Ei;t R 0 ) Ei;t+1 R 0.
Lemma A.3. Given P1a and P1b are to be played in stage t and thereafter, the game
will end immediately with prices as stipulated in Table A1.
34It is a bit tedious to verify that o¤ the equilibrium path strategies can be con-
structed in such a way that, while they are best responses, no one can gain by uni-
lateral deviations from P1a or P1b.
Lemma A.4. Given that P1 is played in stages after t; there does not exist a bene-
…cial unilateral deviation from P1a or from P1b.
Given Lemmas A2 to A4, Proposition A.1 is immediate. In order to prove that P1a
and P1b will be played hereafter, one must show that bene…cial unilateral deviations
are impossible, (1) when simultaneously all other players follow P1a, and (2) when
simultaneously all other players follow P1b. Case (2) is easiest to see and is apparent
from Lemma A.3. For case (1), we should consider two types of deviations: less-
aggressive and more-aggressive. A less aggressive deviation is one in which upon
accepting the o¤er the payo¤ to the deviator is less than what P1a and P1b allow
him (hence, a lower (greater) asking price when the deviator is a seller (buyer)). A
more-aggressive deviation is just the opposite of a less-aggressive deviation. It refers
to an asking price greater (lower) than the deviator’s asking price as prescribed by
P1a when the deviator is a seller (buyer). That a less-aggressive deviation can never
be bene…cial can be shown easily. Basically, the deviation can be bene…cial only when
the o¤er is not accepted, and in the next stage the competition becomes more favorable
to the deviator so that he or she can obtain a greater payo¤ even after discounting.
This, however, is impossible, as it will happen only if somebody else makes a strictly
dominated decision in stage t.
To show that a more aggressive deviation can never be bene…cial, one needs to
35stipulate the response strategy prescription—which we call P2—to any of such uni-
lateral deviations from P1a. P2 is basically the same as P1b, except for the responder
who is supposed to accept the deviator’s candidate equilibrium proposal prescribed
by P1b. Depending on the case, that responder is prescribed either to reject any o¤er
or to accept some other o¤er. By so doing, this ensures that, if the responder survives
the next stage, he will see a competition environment similar to the one in the last
stage (Ei;t+1 = Ei;t). In this case his payo¤ from stage t+1 (given that P1a and P1b
are to be played) will be de…nitely greater than that from accepting the deviating
o¤er in stage t. The last thing to show is that no unilateral deviations from P2 will
be bene…cial given that P1a and P1b are to be played hereafter. This again is indeed
true. All of the above altogether shows Proposition A.1.
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 3.1.
The …rst part of the proposition is easy to prove. Result (a) of the second part is
trivial. We now show result (b), and proofs of the rest are similar. Suppose the result
in (b) is not true, and there exists an allocation in the core such that some seller in
Si
1 (say s0) successfully sells its general investment at p > 0: Note that Ei > 0 implies
excess supply of general investments to Bi
1: Somebody’s (say, s00) general investment
would be redundant. Now consider a subcoalition which includes every agent but s0.
The worth of this subcoalition would be the same as the grand coalition, denoted by
v. The reason is that the general investment sold by s0 is now replaced by that of s00
and becomes reductant. As the initial allocation assigns a sum of payo¤s to members
of the subcoalition of v¡p < v, the subcoalition can then pro…t by breaking away. It
is thus contradictory to the claim that the original allocation is in the core.
36Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 4.2 (where jSj ¸ jBj)
The results are developed in several steps. (Recall that the subscript j = 1;2;3
stands for general investment, nonduplicate speci…c investment, and duplicate speci…c
investment, respectively.)
Step 1. jSi
3j = 0;i = 1;2;3: Since a duplicate speci…c investment is sold at zero price
(pi
3 = 0;i = 1;2;3), no sellers will make a duplicate investment in equilibrium.
Step 2. Ei · 0;i = 1;2;3: Otherwise, some seller si
1k will have to sell her gen-
eral investment at a price of zero. This cannot be an equilibrium outcome because,
foreseeing this, si
1k would not have made a general investment in stage 1.
Step 3. E3 = 0: Otherwise, taking into consideration of step 1 and that E3 takes an
integer value, it must be that E3 · ¡1, also implying ¢3 · ¡1: This means that
there exists some seller in S3nS3
1 6= Á who either does not have an investment, or
has made a duplicate speci…c investment, or has made a speci…c investment whose
intended buyer does not exist. This seller could have been made better o¤ by making
and selling a general investment at a price of at least m=(1+±): Hence a contradiction.
Step 4. E2 = 0:
Suppose it is not true. Since E2 · 0 (from step 2) and it takes on an integer value,
it must be that E2 · ¡1: From E3 = 0 (step 3); we have ¢3 · 0: If ¢3 < 0; then, from
the de…nition of E3 and the fact that E3 = 0 (step 3), we have ¢2+maxf0;¢1g > 0:
Then E2 = E3; a contradiction. Hence, ¢3 = 0; and we have E2 = maxf0;¢1g+¢2:
Consider any arbitrary seller in S2nS2
1: Because S2
3 = Á (step 1), the seller must be
either (i) with no investment or (ii) with an investment uniquely speci…c to a buyer
in B1
1 or (iii) with an investment uniquely speci…c to a buyer in B2
2 or (iv) with an
37investment uniquely speci…c to a buyer in B3
2: For cases (i) and (ii), the seller should
have made a general investment. Then jS2
1j is increased by one, and consequently E2
is increased by one, and still E2 · 0: This means that the deviating seller can sell
its general investment at a price of at least m=2: Clearly such a unilateral deviation
is bene…cial, a contradiction. For case (iii), the seller should have made a general
investment. In this case both jS2
1j and jB2
1j will be increased by one, both ¢1 and
¢2 remain unchanged, and consequently E2 remains unchanged. In other words, a
bene…cial unilateral deviation for the seller exists, a contradiction. For case (iv), the
seller should have made a general investment. In this case, both jS2
1j and jB3
1j are
increased by one. Since ¢3 before the deviation is zero, the above change reduces
minf0; ¢3g by one as well. Altogether, E2 is unchanged and such a deviation becomes
bene…cial, a contradiction. Hence it must be that E2 = 0:
Step 5. E1 = 0:
Suppose, otherwise, E1 < 0: Since E1 must take on an integer value, this means
E1 · ¡1: More importantly, this implies that the general investment made by sellers
in S1 is sold at a price of m: Consider any arbitrary seller in S1nS1
1. Because S1
3 = Á,
the seller must be either (i) with no investment or (ii) with an investment uniquely
special to a buyer in B1
2 or (iii) with an investment uniquely special to a buyer in B2
2;
or (iv) with an investment uniquely special to a buyer in B3
2: For case (i), it is easy to
show that this seller could be made better o¤ by making a general investment rather
than no investment. For cases (ii) to (iv), it is easy to show that the seller can be
better o¤ by making a general investment rather than a special investment. (Details
similar to that in step 4.) This is contradictory to the assumption that E1 < 0:
38Altogether, this implies that E1 = E2 = E3 = 0: Now that pi
1 is m=2, each seller
in Si can be made better o¤ by having switched to an investment speci…c to the buyer
who is supposed to purchase the seller’s general investment. By so doing, she earns
M=2; rather than m=2: What this suggests is that jSi
1j = jBi
1j = 0;i = 1;2;3; and
that only speci…c investments will be made when jSj ¸ jBj:
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 4.3. (where jSj < jBj)
The results are developed in several steps. (Recall that the subscript j = 1;2;3
stands for general investment, nonduplicate speci…c investment, and duplicate speci…c
investment, respectively.)
Step 1. jSi
3j = 0;i = 1;2;3:
Step 2. Ei · 0;i = 1;2;3:
Step 3. E3 = 0:








Step 5. That E1 = E2 = E3 = 0 is impossible.
Note that




either ¢1 > 0 and ¢2 + minf0;¢3g < 0;
or ¢1 = 0 and ¢2 + minf0;¢3g = 0:
But by de…nition ¢1 cannot be positive. Hence the above equality implies ¢1 = 0





2j · jSij;i = 1;2;3 and jBi
1j + jBi




































This is contradictory to Step 4.
Step 6. That E1 < E2 = E3 = 0 is impossible.
Given ¢1 · 0; E2 = E3 = 0 implies that ¢2 = ¡¢3 ¸ 0: Given this, E1 < 0
implies ¢1 < 0: Hence any seller in S1nS1
1 6= Á must be either (i) with no investment
or (ii) with a speci…c investment for a buyer in [3
i=1Bi
2: In case of (i), the seller could
have made a general investment. Then ¢1 is increased by one while ¢2 and ¢3
remain unchanged. Therefore, E1 · 0 and the deviating seller can sell its general
investment at a price of at least m=(1 + ±). She is then better o¤. In case of (ii),
the seller could have made a general investment, instead of a speci…c investment. If
his initial speci…c investment is for a buyer in B1
2; all ¢i’s remain unchanged; if in
B2
2; ¢1 is increased by one, ¢2 is decreased by one, and ¢3 remains unchanged; if
in B3
2;¢1 is increased by one, ¢3 is decreased by one, and ¢2 remains unchanged.
In all cases, E1 remains unchanged. Hence the seller’s deviation can lead him to a
payo¤ of m; instead of M=2 or 0: Such a bene…cial deviation, however, is impossible
in equilibrium, a contradiction.
40Steps 1 to 6 lead to the conclusion that E1 < 0;E2 < 0; and E3 = 0; implying
p1
1 = p2
1 = m and p3




2j = jS3j: This completes the whole proof.
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